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In view of these contentions, to which I have tried to give some degree of reasonableness, I do not think that the time has come to discard our study of imitative behavior as Bohn⁹ seems to think, nor to throw aside the category of imitation as Thorndike would have us do. That a final interpretation of the facts must wait upon the accumulation of a much larger body of material than we now have is certain. On the other hand, there is equal certainty that we must not telescope the facts so far ascertained with theories that do not give full justice to these facts. What our present situation indicates is a reworking of the concept of imitation by discarding the old classification and proceeding to a new classification based on objectively observed facts. That the experimentally determined data are as yet wholly inadequate for a final statement is admitted. Such a reorganization must take account of all the factors that determine attention and of the various levels of accuracy and complexity in the imitative behavior. The first step in the process of reorganization is to convince ourselves that the old classification has reached the limit of its usefulness; the second step is to construct a new classification for a single species of animal, and to follow this with a like service for other species, in every case basing the classification on the facts which have been brought to light by experimental investigation; the third step will be to push the experimental analysis of imitative behavior much farther than we have yet done, and in the end we may be able to speak with positive understanding about the imitative behavior of animals.

M. E. HAGGERTY.

INDIANA UNIVERSITY.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Motive Force and Motivation Tracks: A Research in Will Psychology.

E. BOYD BARRETT, S.J. London: Longmans, Green, & Company. 1911. Pp. xiv + 225.

Those who are watching the progress of psychology will easily be reminded, through the present work, of Cardinal Mercier's efforts to interest catholic philosophers in experimental psychology. Broadly speaking, the Cardinal's propaganda in favor of the latest phases of psychological research can not be said to have been very fruitful among his correligionists. Where they have tackled psychological subjects experimentally, in following Cardinal Mercier's advice, they have done so with the intention of showing the exact manner in which the catholic philosopher must look upon experimental psychology rather than for the purpose of solving any particular problem.

⁹ Georges Bohn, "La Nouvelle Psychologie Animale," page 185.

It can not be said that Barrett's work is an exception to this rule; this author, a member of the Society of Jesus, swears by the name of Cardinal Mercier. His work, however, gives us an excellent summary of the current theories of will. The subject is thus covered more satisfactorily than in any other recent publication, at least in so far as the literature pertaining to it is concerned, and for this service we may be thankful to the author. His familiarity with modern theories of the will no less than his easy flowing style renders the reading of his book a pleasure even to one untrained technically. Such fundamental problems as determinism, automatism, and the evolution of motivation are treated, on the whole, in a competent way, although the author's contention that the work shows, even indirectly, "the worthlessness of the psychological arguments for determinism" is unfounded. The strictly empirical experimental portion of the work shows nothing of this kind. His criticism of hedonism is particularly sound, provided we limit the use of the term, to a physical sense, in connection with activities of lower order, and, in man, to conscious mental processes.

We turn to the experimental matters reported upon in the book. Experiments were carried on with five subjects, including the author. Eight liquids, specially prepared, were used, to which nonsense names were given. Subjects were asked to taste the eight substances in rotation thrice every morning and thrice every evening, after calling out their respective names as given. The strength of these associations was tested by means of recognition tests, and then followed the choice experiments proper.

These were as follows: The nonsense names, printed on cards, were revealed to the subject, as in the ordinary association tests, by means of Ach's changing machine. Subject was instructed: "React when you know what it is." By arranging the names of the substances in the order of hedonic feelings they evoked, a definite scale of values was obtained, differing, of course, for each subject according to his subjective likes and dislikes.

Next, cards were printed in various combinations, and two of different hedonic value were made to appear at the same time over glasses containing the respective solutions. Subject was requested to choose a solution and drink it. A Hipp chronoscope measured the interval between the appearance of the card and the time of reaction. By means of Ewald's key, a Vernier chronoscope was started by the reaction so that the time elapsing between the reaction and the realization of the choice was also measured.

It will be noted that the processes of motivation and choice, which the author set out to investigate, took place in the interval between the perception of the excitant (in this case the card) and the active realization of the choice. This interval was subjected to close introspective scrutiny. The subjects made note of the motives which actuated them in the choice. The motivation factors, of course, were found to be mostly hedonic; they are divided by the author, arbitrarily, it would seem, into extrinsic and intrinsic. The author also speaks of "motivation tracks"; this adds to the plasticity and clearness of his thought, but when he per-

sists in this direction to the extent of actually mapping out tracks or curves of motive force the reader can not escape the impression that this is one more instance in which a happy simile has been made to bear more than it will support. It would be difficult for the author to convince his readers of the actual occurrence of such tracks and curves as he draws out skilfully, even if he should take the trouble, which he evidently thought unnecessary in the present connection, of disclosing all the proofs he has for their support.

In its final term, it was found that motivation becomes steadied and more and more automatic, that is, independent of conscious attention. This accords with our general empirical notions and is an illustration of the economizing tendency of volition. The opposite of this steadiness of purpose, hesitation, occurred frequently in the course of the author's experiments and is discussed by him in a special chapter, in which he treats of hesitation as a disease of the will and suggests ways of healing.

Whatever might be said of the practicability or therapeutic value of the author's remedies for impairment of the will, it is difficult to see wherein the author's claim that "these suggestions are based on the consideration of the actual results of our experiments" is justified. Suppose we look up his universal remedy or grand arcanum, we find it stated as follows (p. 218): "With regard to hesitation which is, *par excellence*, the malady of the will, inasmuch as it destroys serious motivation and leads to irregularities and inconsistencies, the great means of avoiding it is to acquire the habit of serious, decisive choosing and to avoid repining over past choices." Leaving aside, for the present, the manifestly unwise teaching about "not repining over past choices," it must be said that such advice, far from being the product of experimental research, is the rawest kind of empiricism. Any country gossip is prepared to tell that what ails neighbor Jones, who is run down on account of gastric ulcer, is the absence of good nourishing food and plenty of it. The need of nourishment may be very obvious in the case of neighbor Jones and where the will is not sufficient more will and plenty of it is logical enough, but such prescriptions are far from what is really needed. Other remedies suggested by the author are similarly superficial, even though they be ideally logical enough.

The reader who will turn to this work expecting to find some new light on the subject of will and its motivation will probably be disappointed, but to one who wants the subject reviewed attractively and brought down to date this book will be highly welcome.

Though not quite germane to the subject under consideration, the reviewer thinks it his duty to express disapproval of a peculiar trick which may as well be branded here and now as unworthy of a scientist. The name of a liberal educator, who has recently suffered martyrdom in Spain, is dragged in by the author ostensibly to illustrate a point, but in reality to besmirch his memory. It is unfortunate that even the dead are not safe from such underhanded attacks. The peculiar villainy consists not merely in attaching an opprobrious epithet to an honored man, now dead, in a spirit of partizanship, but in doing so in connection with a work the read-

ers of which are not expected perhaps to know the details of the situation to which reference is made. It is a sophisticated way of carrying prejudice over into quarters where it may not otherwise have a chance to be heard, in the hope that through ignorance of the actual facts it may take root. Nothing is more clear to careful and impartial observers of contemporary events than that Francesco Ferrer did not "hold sway for three days over half a million people, burning their churches, schools, museums, and all they held most precious." This allegation is false in every respect. While such falsehoods are not uncommon, especially in certain interested quarters, one would not expect them to be paraded in front of unsuspecting students of psychology who may be unfamiliar with the details of the situation, and least of all in a work like the present.

The mention of Ferrer, the advocate of peace and apostle of secular education, in the same breadth with the sort of anarchists which the author's fancy depicts, above all the bringing of this matter furtively into this book, is not without a purpose. One's adversary is shown in the wrong and placed *hors de combat*, as it were, at least in so far as public sympathy is concerned (especially if the adversary be dead and unable to defend himself against a false charge) if one succeeds to brand the adversary's memory with some title or epithet repulsive to public opinion. This E. Boyd Barrett, S.J., has endeavored to do parenthetically by throwing a sentence or two into the midst of matter with which the object of his bias has nothing in common. A remark thrown in sideways, where the hearer is not on guard and is unprepared, is more likely to take root than otherwise. It is this that invests the offense of E. Boyd Barrett, S.J., with particular gravity.

Fortunately, no event of historic import in our generation has been the subject of such a thorough and impartial study as the Ferrer case. It is hoped that readers, upon seeing in print Barrett's assault upon the memory of Ferrer will be moved thereby to examine Wm. Archer's "Life, Trial, and Death of Francesco Ferrer" (London: Chapman & Hall, 1911), and thus acquaint themselves with the "Spanish Dreyfus" case, and with the true story of those troublous days in Spain.

J. S. VAN TESLAAR.

CLARK UNIVERSITY.

Essentials of Psychology. W. B. PILLSBURY. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. ix + 358.

On reading this book one must conclude that Professor Pillsbury has written an excellent elementary text-book of psychology. The mode of presentation is such as to interest the student and the general reader, while the style is forceful and clear. Students and teachers will find the exercises connected with each main topic very usable and well devised for testing and applying the principles brought out in the discussion. The references given at the end of each chapter are, for the most part, to similar treatments from other texts. The topics treated in the book are practically the same as those in most introductory texts except chapters fourteen and fifteen, which deal, respectively, with "Work, Fatigue and Sleep,"